On the Nature of War

INITIAL STATEMENT UPON THE IMPORTANCE OF READING CLAUSEWITZ AND OTHER DIALECTICAL THINKERS THROUGH DIALECTICAL THINKING, NOT JUST ANALYTICAL:

Clausewitz is described often as a Hegelian. There is no proof other than the dialectical nature of “On War” which can prove this, along with the possibility by the means of being an important figure in Prussia in a time simultaneous to Hegel which would prove this. However, given the dialectical nature of “ On War”, it is important that the study is made in a very systematic manner looking at it through dialectical means instead of simply reading the book and thinking about it in a manner of “what does Clausewitz mean?” While this is important for interpretation, this is only a half truth and so its not a complete necessity. One must not only read, but a huge aim is to criticize the writer and treat the dialectics as it was formed: through the friction of a war of ideas(particularly, the historical instance of Clausewitz’s friction of the war of ideas came between him and Baron De Jomini as well as their followers which happened well up until World War 2, and many a synthesis formed in Germany, America, Britain,Russia and France).

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS WAR?

Clausewitz, in the first chapter sets out war as a means to an end. The end being an ultimate political objective. In order to set this out, he makes numerous important statements:

1.”War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale.”

2. “War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”

3.” The aim of war is to disarm the enemy.”

4. “War is never an isolated act.”

5.”War does not consist of a single instantaneous blow.”

6. “Politics is the womb which war develops.”

If war is a duel on an extensive scale, then it is each division under different officers of war that matters. Like a warrior, whose arms and hands are the most important. The point of Clausewitz in stating this is that a war should be followed to capitulate an enemy through the force of arms and strategy. However, Clausewitz makes a fatal flaw in his example: he also talks to suppose two wrestlers... and in this, Clausewitz unknowingly ignores the concept of friction in his definition for war is more like a street fight put by gangs of countrymen instead of a fair battle royale of mutually agreeing upon the rules fighters trying to win a game.

Of course, though, his analogy gives to us a good point to what he defines war as: an act of violence to compel an enemy to fulfill what we will. However, I think he is flawed here because he is conflating strategy(strategie) with war(krieg). War, which is developed in politics, must be related entirely to the political realm. So, we must think about what a state is, and when one examines how human institutions work, they work no differently than a family upon a bigger scale(see Aristotle’s politics: Aristotle speaks of a village as a group of families , and a State as the group of villages). So, war is a feud on a bigger scale between two countries. War starts in the failed diplomacy, and friction gradually turns into violent action until the first attack, and two state shall fight it out until one state is demolished or submissive to the will of the superior state.

One only has to look at the wars of the Greeks to realize this. The Spartans, in order to claim victory over the Athenians, instilled the oligarchy known as “The Thirty Tyrants,” by which would be an Athens ruled by pro-Laconian rulers and effectively ruining the Athenian system of democracy.Also, when the Greeks were conquered by the Romans, the Romans took advantage of the feuding of the different leagues of City States and established a consulship to abolish the Greek system and put in a government of Romans.

This brings us to the aim of war being to disarm an opponent. This is both a true and false idea. It is false in the fact that you have historical instances of disarmed opponents who still come out on top by stalling action and other stratagems,but you also have the need to disarm before you can decide what to do with an enemy. When an enemy’s power is annihilated and therefore that he is “disarmed”, it is sometimes more advantageous to wipe the enemy out instead of setting up a protectorate. However, this type of war: that of annihilation, is only true of wars of conquests and intestinal wars where governments struggle about home territories and that the best defense is to completely put down a competing force and structure in the region.

Clausewitz mentions then that to defeat an enemy, one must attack the enemy’s powers of resistance. Upon practical terms, this can be done by defeating the enemy’s will to victory(propaganda warfare, war weariness,etc. inducing public dislike for war, and mutiny), economic attacks( wiping out the enemy’s trade routes and resources), tactical attacks( wiping out professional warriors, attacking militia) and political attack ( using allies and cutting enemy’s allies). I have no dislike for this principle because it shows that a country has many options to win a war.

On the modification of reality, it is a good statement which Clausewitz next makes. The philosophy of war,dealing with something so extreme as war, has the mind thinking about the extreme. So, the the mind must reach to an extreme to examine warfare,but this doesn’t translate well to reality over pen. That is what Clausewitz is saying. However, I do think that he doesn’t treat human systems(which are to manage chaos systematically) in a very just manner.

If logical strictness were a problem, then structures themselves are a problem. However, in order to deal best with chaos, we have to see a manner by which chaos can be overcome. So, in the concrete sense, militaries as far back as the ancient Sumerians, created formations to manage huge bodies of men fighting against other huge bodies of men. Over the years, these formations have become smaller and smaller until the platoon was not as important as the squad in the use of tactics to find some strategist’s idea of an objective and complete it.

In the sense of war, it is like the Marxist view of dialectics. The thinking cannot be completely strict,but a dialectic in flex. The line of operations must be done in such a manner as to induce an enemy to act a certain way(like Belisarius in his tactics or Sun Tzu by lowering out the enemy to attack,then defeating in a powerful counter as two examples of this principle applied to the tactical) and then attack in a manner which deceives and manipulates an enemy.

T.E Lawrence, in WWI, in order to take the field, often fought in a manner of pinpricks instead of decisive victories. Octavian’s great general Agrippa did the same in preference of saving strength as opposed to bringing it all up at once to conquer an enemy,and thus risk to be defeated entirely. This type of warfare is termed by some as “Fabian strategy”,but I should rather term it as the dialectical materialism in war. Once one objective is taken, another objective suddenly rises in response to that whether it is to defend or assault a position.

Clausewitz then continues on to saying that war doesn’t consist of one instant blow. I agree with this statement. So, I will not give a criticism of it too strictly to warn against it by rational principle. War starts, as I have mentioned before, by a feud between states. This can be as simple as diplomatic struggles of a nation to consolidate power while the other nation is blocking it, or something more complex as wars of opinion between different ideologies of politics trying to get supremacy in the world. For complex reasons and simple reasons, men are goaded to destroy each other. So, by this, war is a gradual increase of skirmish by skirmish to a stronger and greater battle until the climax(but since Clausewitz mentions this all, I will leave those passages out of my critique for space and time) and then peace happens when one side has completely capitulated or been destroyed.

“The result of war is not always absolute.” This is a fact that we see in numerous historical instances. A treaty of a previous war often creates the context to the next. a shrewd political figure often rises from obscurity and uses the “unfair conditions” caused to the nation that lost to rally them and give them greater determination and then uses the State to create more power through arms to get vengeance on the previous winners. So, since war is not absolute, it is important that a victorious nation should always keep training and improving itself as the Romans did even in times of peace. Also, that a defeated nation should always seek a manner by which to respond to the defeat and consolidate power to recover.

Next is the idea of military history being important to theory. This concept is equally important to the Clausewitzians as it is to the Jominians. When you look at the revolutions of war through different time periods and “great captains,” you see that Clausewitz is correct here. While his statement is different, that he wants to avoid being against military history through seeing war as political instead of independent, the general idea is good as much as the more detailed one.

The second point he makes in this point is a very interesting one that wars are different in character “according to the motives and circumstances that proceed.” This is a very profound historical act. When one examines the Spanish ulcer and then that of the German wars of liberation, the manner of response is far different. The Germans, both that of the decaying Holy Roman Empire(and Austrians) and the Prussians, had professional armies while the circumstance the Spanish had was that they didn’t have professional armies. The Germans lost many of their battles,but were more capable of responding in large armies, while the Spanish were forced to use guerrilla war and petit’ guerre to resist the French occupation. However, since it is arguable that the “Napoleonic Wars” were not just a series of different wars,but one war... I would say that the theater of war is determined by complex socio-political and topographical concerns are what show a difference in war. So, a wise country or a wise commander shall select generals who are well educated in the philosophy of politics as much as the philosophy of war, and knowledgeable of the science of war in accord to topographical engineering.

Now, we go on to friction to close this examination of the Nature of War, or Book One of Carl Von Clausewitz’s On War. Friction is what separates “paper” with reality. Friction is caused by three different things:

1. The material condition of a war- supplies, the amount of men, location,available technology and the topography of the location.

2. The political objective of the country, its allies and the enemy country and its allies.

3.The ideal condition- the will of victory in the citizenry and soldiers, the will of the enemy and the enemy’s allies.

So, when a plan happen, an enemy will do what he can conceive to defeat the plan. This goes to show that a conflict shall be best understood by those experienced in the conflict,but anyone can see friction and respond with a less trained eye than the one who is experience. This is why the Romans had regular legions and legions known as “veteran”, and also why the earlier Romans before the Marian Reforms had Triarii, the most experienced troops in the militia in reserve to respond to the most dangerous parts of a battle.

So, a wise strategist shall realize that friction and the conditions that cause friction shall be best responded to by selecting the best and most experienced tacticians to respond to the situation at hand. The Prussians, to defeat the French, used flexible systems to put this type of thing in place. A strategist and a general generally speaking knows less than officers under him fighting on the field. The officer fighting on the field knows as much,but with a more educated eye, the struggles and friction the troops endure.

Hence, I conclude the first book critique of Clausewitz.